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fix(security): update vulnerability-updates [security] - #1434

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Change Age Confidence
dompurify 3.4.12 → 3.4.13 age confidence
js-yaml 4.3.0 → 4.3.1 age confidence
mermaid 11.15.0 → 11.16.1 age confidence

DOMPurify: IN_PLACE hook removal leaves a detached subtree executable, causing XSS

GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7

More information

Details

Summary

During IN_PLACE sanitization, a hook that removes an element can leave that element's detached descendants executable. A descendant image can retain its attacker-provided onload handler and fire after sanitize() returns, even though the returned root is clean and the image remains disconnected from the document.

Details

In DOMPurify 3.4.12, _sanitizeElements() in src/purify.ts:1862-1904 runs the beforeSanitizeElements or uponSanitizeElement hook and returns immediately when the hook detached the current node. The return does not call _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode).

The detached subtree is not added to DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE neutralization cannot reach it. If the browser queued a resource event while the application constructed the detached dirty root, a descendant can therefore retain its handler and execute after sanitization.

The hook only rejects the containing element and does not add or approve the event handler. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path de-arms the same queued event; only the hook-detachment early return skips the existing subtree neutralization.

PoC

Load the published dompurify@3.4.12 dist/purify.js before this script in Chromium:

<div id="result">not fired</div>
<script>
const root = document.createElement('div');
root.innerHTML = `
  <footer>
    <img src=""
         onload="result.textContent = 'XSS after sanitize'">
  </footer>
  <div>safe</div>`;

DOMPurify.setConfig({
  ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text', 'footer'],
  IN_PLACE: true
});
DOMPurify.addHook('uponSanitizeElement', node => {
  if (node.tagName === 'FOOTER') node.remove();
});

DOMPurify.sanitize(root);
document.body.append(root);
</script>

sanitize() returns with no handler execution and the returned root contains only the safe div. After the event loop advances, the original image remains disconnected but its retained onload changes the page to XSS after sanitize.

As the claim-matched control, use the same detached input with ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text'] and no hook. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path removes the original image's handler, the returned root is still <div>safe</div>, and the marker does not fire.

Impact

In an application that uses IN_PLACE with the documented element-removal hook pattern, an attacker who can supply HTML can execute JavaScript in the integrating application's origin after the application sanitizes and renders that content.

The required non-default configuration is IN_PLACE plus a hook that removes a containing element. The hook does not add or approve the event handler, and the dirty root never needs to be connected before sanitization.

Suggested fix

Reuse the existing _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode) helper before returning from both hook-detachment branches in _sanitizeElements(). Add regressions for beforeSanitizeElements and uponSanitizeElement that retain a reference to a descendant resource element and verify that its event handler is removed after the hook detaches its ancestor.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.1 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) — CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported

GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj

More information

Details

Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)
Summary

resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.

!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.

This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was
fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently
maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.

Affected versions
Line Latest tested Status
3.x 3.15.0 Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29
4.x 4.3.0 Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30
5.x 5.2.2 Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set)

Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so
this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.

Details

lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):

if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)
else return false

objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.

The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):

if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map'
carrier.seen.add(key)
Proof of concept
// poc.js  —  node poc.js
const yaml = require('js-yaml');
const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';

for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {
  const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();
  yaml.load(d);                      // default schema, no options
  console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);
}
Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)

js-yaml 4.3.0

n=10000  bytes=137787   load=54ms
n=20000  bytes=297787   load=169ms
n=40000  bytes=617787   load=646ms
n=80000  bytes=1257787  load=2607ms

js-yaml 3.15.0

n=10000  bytes=137787   load=53ms
n=20000  bytes=297787   load=166ms
n=40000  bytes=617787   load=641ms
n=80000  bytes=1257787  load=2567ms

Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).

Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.

Impact

Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be
stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request
blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process —
so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.

Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in
5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or
user interaction required.

Suggested fix

Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:

// lib/type/omap.js
const seen = new Set()
// ...
if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false
seen.add(pairKey)

This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.

References
  • CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
  • lib/type/omap.js (3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolver
  • lib/schema/default.js — registers !!omap in the default schema
Discovery

Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run
against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by
executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured
on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Mermaid Architecture diagrams are vulnerable to prototype pollution

CVE-2026-71437 / GHSA-3rrr-jr9j-h3q3

More information

Details

Rendering an untrusted architecture-beta diagram lets the diagram author write an arbitrary property with the value horizontal or vertical onto Object.prototype. A group id of __proto__ is accepted as a valid parent.

Impact

Any code in the same realm that reads a property of that name from an arbitrary object, or enumerates an object with bare for...in, observes the injected value (which can only be the string horizontal or vertical.

This may mean corrupted option/config defaults, bypassed truthiness checks, causing denial of service or logic corruption in the embedding application.

Because the injected value cannot be an object or function, this is not directly exploitable for remote code execution.

PoC
architecture-beta
      group mermaidPrototypePollutionMarker(cloud)[Marker]
      service a(server)[A] in __proto__
      service b(server)[B] in mermaidPrototypePollutionMarker
      a:R -- L:b

The vulnerable write was introduced in commit cb0a4703bdf01d47508bde1c08aa9a980d70bc20 and first shipped in mermaid@11.5.0. The lines are unchanged in every release since.

Patches

This has been patched by mermaid-js/mermaid@99af3fc, released in Mermaid v11.16.1

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds. Please update to a patched version.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Mermaid radar diagrams are vulnerable to DoS

CVE-2026-71439 / GHSA-rhh3-jpg6-66xh

More information

Details

Impact

Mermaid radar diagrams allow arbitrary large values for ticks, which can cause high CPU usage, freezing the webpage/JavaScript process for long periods of time, until the process is eventually killed due to OOM/running out of memory.

Proof-of-concept
radar-beta
  axis a, b
  curve c {1, 1}
  ticks 1000000000
Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?

This problem has been patched by mermaid-js/mermaid@59b22fa, which was released in Mermaid v11.16.1

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?

There are no known workarounds without updating to a patched version of mermaid.

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Mermaid allows CSS injection applying to sibling elements of the diagram

CVE-2026-50159 / GHSA-6x64-9x62-f2gx

More information

Details

Summary

Mermaid does not fully restrict CSS to the rendered SVG subtree. Although selectors are prefixed with #mermaid-X, sibling (~ and +) combinators can still escape the Mermaid container and inject styles to DOM elements adjacent to the diagram <svg>.

Most users of mermaid would not be affected by this, as mermaid adds its <svg> as an only child of it's parent element. However, you may be affected if you manually insert the <svg> (or other elements) into the DOM yourself.

Details

Mermaid namespaces CSS through with a middleware intended to scope all rules to the diagram's SVG element. CSS nesting expands & ~ * { ... } to #svgId ~ *, which selects all sibling elements following the SVG in the DOM, outside the diagram boundary.

Impact

An attacker able to supply diagram source to a page (e.g., user-generated content rendered by Mermaid) could inject CSS rules affecting sibling elements to the diagram <svg> on the host page. This can be used for UI redressing, hiding content, conditional CSS-based probing, or phishing-style visual manipulation.

JavaScript execution is not possible via this vector.

Patches

This has been patched in mermaid-js/mermaid@12d472c and released in Mermaid v11.16.1.

A backport has been made for the v10 branch in 7e83f1533318b307764d961906a73377266f4c5e and was released in Mermaid v10.9.8

Workarounds

If you are inserting the <svg> into the DOM yourself, you can wrap it in an element with no other children, e.g. <div><svg>...</svg></div> or element.innerHTML = svg. Alternatively, you can use mermaid.run() or mermaid.initialize() which will do this for you.

Setting "securityLevel": "sandbox" will also prevent this, or setting the secure config value in the mermaid config to avoid allowing diagrams to modify fontFamily, themeCSS, altFontFamily, and themeVariables.

To test, you can try using a themeCSS with & + * { /* my CSS here */} and see if it's applied outside of your mermaid <svg>.

---
config:
  themeCSS: |-
    & + * { background:red !important; width:100vw !important; height:100vh !important; position:fixed !important; inset:0 !important; }
---
info
References

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Mermaid configuration APIs allow prototype pollution

CVE-2026-71438 / GHSA-c4c3-pg64-4m4v

More information

Details

Summary

Mermaid's configuration setters (mermaid.initialize, mermaidAPI.setConfig, and mermaidAPI.updateSiteConfig) merge the caller-supplied configuration object into Mermaid's internal config using the assignWithDepth deep-merge helper that is vulnerable to prototype pollution.

Because these APIs are intended to receive trusted configuration supplied by the application integrating Mermaid, Mermaid assesses the practical risk as low. The vulnerability is only reachable if an application forwards attacker-controlled data directly into one of these configuration entry points, which is outside their documented usage.

User-controlled configuration (e.g. configuration in diagram code using %%{init: {}}%% or YAML frontmatter) are already protected from prototype pollution.

Patches

This has been patched in mermaid-js/mermaid@2cd6dcf and released in Mermaid v11.16.1.

A backport has been made for the v10 branch in c34b07a0815842327e70794d69b0c8c5a1e2a956 and was released in Mermaid v10.9.8

Impact

Mermaid believes it's unlikely that anybody is impacted, as these functions are configuration entry points expected to receive trusted, developer-controlled values as they can modify other security-relevant configuration.

Workarounds

Don't pass user-controlled data to the mermaid.initialize, mermaidAPI.setConfig, and mermaidAPI.updateSiteConfig functions. Instead, users can use %%{init: {}}%% or YAML frontmatter in diagrams.

Reporters

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 2.4 / 10 (Low)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Mermaid XY Charts are vulnerable to an infinite loop DoS

CVE-2026-71436 / GHSA-2v8p-3f2j-5mp7

More information

Details

Impact

Mermaid XY Charts are vulnerable to an infinite loop DoS attack in the setXAxisRangeData(), when configuring an X-Axis with invalid parameters.

As each loop appends an element to an array, this would generally only cause an RangeError: Invalid array length to appear after a few seconds, but may cause the page/JavaScript process to crash due to memory exhaustion, depending on the environment.

Proof-of-concept
xychart
  x-axis 1 --> 1
  line [1, 2]
Patches

This has been patched in mermaid-js/mermaid@630aa7e and released in Mermaid v11.16.1.

A backport has been made for the v10 branch in ef60adc837d9d5107af21285f01e83dea309bd0a and was released in Mermaid v10.9.8

Workarounds

There are no known workarounds. Please update to the latest version or apply the patch.

References

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 5.3 / 10 (Medium)
  • Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

cure53/DOMPurify (dompurify)

v3.4.13: DOMPurify 3.4.13

Compare Source

  • Fixed an issue with hook removal during IN_PLACE sanitization, thanks @​koyokr
  • Fixed an issue with hooks potentially bypassing the clone guard, thanks @​AkshayjainG
  • Fixed an issue with DOM clobbering via ownerDocument during IN_PLACE, thanks @​AkshayjainG
  • Bumped several dependencies where possible
nodeca/js-yaml (js-yaml)

v4.3.1

Compare Source

mermaid-js/mermaid (mermaid)

v11.16.1

Compare Source

Patch Changes

v11.16.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

  • #​7535 ea1c48f Thanks @​ragelink! - feat(cynefin): Adds the Cynefin framework as a new diagram type (beta) to Mermaid (available as cynefin-beta). The Cynefin framework, created by Dave Snowden, is a decision-making framework that categorizes problems into five complexity domains, widely used in agile, incident management, strategy, and organizational design.

  • #​7721 f45cc2c Thanks @​notionparallax! - feat(treeView): add box-drawing character input support for treeView diagrams

  • #​7550 f1f4d45 Thanks @​DominicBurkart! - feat(xychart): add per-point text labels for xychart line plots

  • #​7527 b4d0442 Thanks @​notionparallax! - feat(treeView): Extends the existing treeView-beta diagram with features useful for representing file/directory structures.

  • #​7793 a6f097d Thanks @​SSDWGG! - feat(er): support optional ER attribute types with a ? suffix

  • #​7772 37f2e36 Thanks @​devareddy05! - feat(gantt): support multiple excludes / includes lines so long exclusion lists can be split into commented groups (#​6270)

  • #​7708 4e63e9d Thanks @​txmxthy! - feat(architecture): add align row|column {ids…} directive to architecture-beta diagrams so authors can declare horizontal or vertical alignment of services explicitly.

  • #​7760 05223be Thanks @​ngdaniels! - feat(pie): Enhance Pie Chart - Enable donut chart, Set legend position, and highlight slice

  • #​7251 216e4e9 Thanks @​ydah! - feat(railroad): Add support for Railroad Diagrams (Syntax Diagrams) with four input syntaxes: IR (railroad-beta), EBNF (railroad-ebnf-beta), ABNF (railroad-abnf-beta), and PEG (railroad-peg-beta).

  • #​7774 e5c75e6 Thanks @​ngdaniels! - feat(xychart): enable rotate label on X-axis

  • #​7791 974fa7b Thanks @​knsv-bot! - feat(swimlane): add swimlane as a standalone diagram type with a dedicated layered orthogonal layout algorithm

Patch Changes

Configuration

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♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR is behind base branch, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

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